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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past decade, local government policy in South Africa has 
proposed a greater degree of local democracy and a greater degree of 
local public participation. The latter, captured under the phrase 
‘developmental local government’, promises local residents engagement 
as voters, as citizens affected by local government policy and as partners 
in resource mobilisation for the development of the municipal area. 
Qualitative fieldwork in a number of small towns in the Western Cape 
conducted in 2000 revealed no common sense of loyalty toward the 
town or its local government. Socio-economic (more than ethnic) 
identity marked differences in orientation. The middle income minority 
engaged both the local council and its municipality in a relationship of 
loyalty and criticism whilst both the affluent as well as the poor had 
withdrawn from local civil society. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Local government reform in South Africa has, over the past decade, passed through 
two analytically distinct phases of policy. The first after the local government 
elections in 1995 and 1996 established local democracy (see Bekker et al 1997, Götz 
1995, Graham 1995). The second enunciated particularly in the White Paper on Local 
Government (1998) established developmental local government which emphasized 
participative planning and local economic initiatives as pre-eminent local government 
goals (Development Southern Africa 1998, MPACD 1998). A third set of policies 
which is emerging at the time of writing (2001), has been preceded by a country-wide 
re-delimitation of areas of jurisdiction and promises more effective and more equitably 
financed local governments (see Bernstein & Clynick 2000, Heymans 2000,  Pillay 
2000) 
 
Within the context of these two first phases of policy reform, the aim of this paper is 
to scrutinize ways in which rank-and-file groups of residents experience their local 
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conditions. Earlier work by the authors completed in 1999 identified the ‘local’ (in 
contradistinction to the provincial or the national or the international) as primary in 
imparting meaning to these residents. We wrote at the time that ‘(p)oliticians and 
opinion-makers appear mesmerised by grand images - the nation, the province, the 
continent. South Africans draw meaning from humbler sources - village, suburb, 
language, minority group. Government action in these spheres is of far greater 
importance than is generally realised’ (Bekker et al 2000). This paper will first outline 
local government policy in terms of its intended influence on the lives of rank-and-file 
residents. The focus will be on the participative and developmental aspects of this 
policy and on strategies proposed by this policy to achieve these. Subsequently, by 
using data generated in the same way as for the earlier study, we will describe shared 
meanings which different groups of residents assign to these strategies. This will 
reveal the differing ways in which groups of local people experience and react to the 
implementation of developmental local government. Explanations will then be 
suggested for these experiences and reactions. 
 
As used in South Africa, local government is an umbrella concept. It includes 
metropolitan government as well as public bodies responsible for settlements ranging 
from cities to small towns and their hinterlands. Not only do circumstances differ 
widely across such forms of local government but also with regard to where within the 
South African space economy these cities and towns are located (see Cameron 1999). 
Four towns have been selected for this study. They are all located within the Western 
Cape, a province enjoying the highest provincial Human Development Index in South 
Africa (Moller 2000). Two are within the economically vibrant immediate hinterland 
of Cape Town, and the other two in the more arid and less economically developed 
West Coast and (eastern) Overberg districts of the province. Afrikaans is the majority 
language in each of these four towns. 
 
However, three advantages flow from this selection. In the first place, as will be 
shown below, a primary strand of developmental local government policy is 
integrated development planning. For more than two years, the Western Cape 
Provincial Administration and its District Councils have been implementing this 
policy, inter alia, in the districts within which the four towns fall.1 In the second 
place, since two of the four towns are relatively better-off, and two relatively worse 
off, rank-and-file groups selected as respondents include individuals covering the 
spectrum of unemployment and employment, as well as blue and white collar jobs. 
The third advantage is that earlier research work using the same methodology was 
undertaken in the same province and the two sets of data are consequently 
comparable. 
 
Research was qualitative and involved a series of focus group discussions with rank-
and-file groupings in the four towns. Each focus group was requested to discuss how 
they ‘felt’ about living in their local residential area, in the Western Cape, and in 
South Africa. Discussions were conducted in the preferred language of each group and 
transcriptions were subsequently translated into English for analysis. The three 
research prompts and subsequent non-directive facilitation of discussion were 
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deliberately chosen to enable groups freely to probe areas of shared meaning. Since 
focus groups were not asked to debate issues directly related to local government 
policy or practice, identification and discussion of such issues produces evidence of 
shared sentiments regarding the importance of local government. Subsequent analysis 
of the narratives within which these shared sentiments were located led to an 
interpretation of the relative importance of the local in comparison with the provincial 
and the national (see Appendix 1). 
  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY 
 
In the wider context of South African public policy, local government’s place has 
changed dramatically since the 1994 general elections. This change is associated with 
changing state strategy toward its primary policy objective of development. In 1993, it 
had been decided that a lengthy process of local level negotiations ratified by the nine 
newly-elected provincial governments needed to take place before local elections 
could be held. In effect, political transition at local level was delayed. Local 
government - the third tier - was considered as insignificant, in the words of a 
commentator at the time, as the ‘loser’ (Christianson 1994). Development was to be 
achieved via the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and was to be 
implemented from above. 
 
Failure of the RDP promoted the idea of decentralisation. Simultaneously, the 1996 
South African Constitution inaugurated the idea of cooperative government in which 
local, provincial and national governments are defined as spheres (rather than as the 
more traditional tiers), and between which coordination and cooperation are 
encouraged. The Constitution also defined the developmental role that municipalities 
are required to play, a role beyond simple service delivery. Municipalities are 
expected to give priority to the basic needs of, and promote the social and economic 
development of, the ‘community’. In 1998, with the launch of the White Paper on 
Local Government, development was firmly located within the local sphere. 
Integrated development planning (IDP) is the central strategy to this end. IDP will be 
the instrument to identify and prioritise the basic needs of communities, and will also 
enable municipalities to manage both horizontal as well as vertical programmes aimed 
at social and economic development.  
 
No longer the insignificant lowest tier, local government now appears to be on centre 
stage, playing an increasingly crucial role in state-led development. In the words of 
the (then) Deputy Director-General responsible for local government in 1998, ‘South 
Africa is currently undergoing a major change within its public sector, in which 
government functions, virtually across the board, are being decentralised to local 
level’ (Olver 1998: 289) and, in the words of the responsible Minister, ‘in terms of the 
new constitution, local government is a sphere of government in its own right and no 
longer a function of national or provincial government’ (Ministry of Provincial Affairs 
1998: i). 
 
Integrated development planning implies participative planning, in particular, 
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planning with a range of institutions in civil society. In the White Paper, this element 
of the process is considered crucial to development. Justification for participative 
planning as an imperative is motivated in the White Paper. In the section (3.3) entitled 
‘Working together with local citizens and partners’, the following words are employed 
: 
 
One of the strengths of integrated development planning is that it 
recognises the linkages between development, delivery and democracy. 
Building local democracy is a central role of local government, and 
municipalities should develop strategies and mechanisms (including, but 
not limited to, participative planning) to continuously engage with 
citizens, business and community groups. 
 
Municipalities require active participation by citizens at four levels: 
 
• As voters - to ensure maximum democratic accountability of the 
elected political leadership for the policies they are 
empowered to promote. 
• As citizens who express, via different stakeholder associations, 
their views before, during and after the policy 
development process in order to ensure that policies reflect 
community preferences as far as possible.  
• As consumers and end-users, who expect value-for-money, 
affordable service and courteous and responsive service.  
• As organised partners involved in the mobilisation of resources 
for development via for-profit businesses, non-
governmental organisations and community-based 
institutions. 
 
Shortly after the publication of this White Paper, an influential weekly newspaper 
commented that '(m)unicipal councils will … have to facilitate a culture of public 
service among staff' and '(c)ouncils will have to build the capacity of residents and 
communities to participate in the affairs of the municipality' (Streek 1999). 
 
In summary, public policy designed to deliver developmental local government 
proposes an ongoing relationship of cooperation and conflict in the local sphere 
between state and civil society.2 Local residents are expected to participate in this 
relationship through the vote (as individuals), through organised pressure on their 
municipality to express preferences and complaints (as members of stakeholder 
associations), through expressions of dissatisfaction over service delivery (as 
consumers), and through public-private partnerships aimed at development (as 
businesses, NGOs and CBOs).  
 
Do these four types of relationship exhaust the options local residents have to act 
publicly at local level? An answer may be found by asking what people do when they 
experience decline in the organisations within which they operate? This is the 
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question Hirschman posed in his book Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970, for a critique 
see Barry 1974). His answer is that people have one of three options: they can grin 
and bear it, simply stick it out; they can express their dissatisfaction in the hope that 
this may improve the situation; or they can quit and seek another organisation. These 
three options relate to the ideas of loyalty, voice, and exit. Hirschman claims that this 
simple model may be applied to private business firms and to public state 
organisations alike. 
 
Accordingly, we view the policy summarized above as offering local people the 
opportunity to belong to civil society, and from that basis to express loyalty or voice, 
support for or resistance to, municipal activities. What this policy aims to avoid is exit 
where local people do not perceive themselves as belonging to civil society and where 
they opt for activities and identities beyond the state-civil society nexus. It is along 
these lines that we will explore below the experiences of three groups of local 
residents in our sample. 
 
THE SAMPLE 
 
Twelve focus group (FG) discussions were organised. In order to ensure a range of 
relevant characteristics in the sample, selection of groups was guided by variations in 
spatial location and in the nature of the group’s residential area. Two towns close to 
Cape Town, Paarl-Wellington and Stellenbosch, and two towns in more rural 
surroundings, Heidelberg in the southern Cape and Vredendal on the West Coast were 
selected. During the fieldwork period, the Local Councils of all four towns were 
governed by party political coalitions, and Mayors in three of the four were 
Independents, reflecting the outcome of coalition politics. 
 
Four groups were selected from former Coloured Group Areas (Wellington Coloured 
and Kylemore, Heidelberg Coloured and Vredendal North); four in informal 
settlements within these towns (Mbekweni and Oliver Tambo in Paarl-Wellington, 
Heidelberg Black and Avila Park in Vredendal); one from a former Black Group Area 
(Kayamandi in Stellenbosch) and three from former White Group Areas (Heidelberg 
White, Stellenbosch White and Strandfontein, close to Vredendal). Table 1 below 
reflects this selection. 
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Table 1: 
Location, classification and composition of Focus Groups (FGs) 
 
  Poor  Middle Income   Affluent 
 
  Race Black Coloured Black Coloured White 
Housing Informal  
settlement   
Formal 
housing 
Formal housing Formal housing Formal housing 
        
Greater  
Cape  
Town 
1 Mbekweni         
(Paarl)  9 
unemployed 1 
blue-collar 
employed   
 1 Kayamandi 
(Stellenbosch)  
3 white-collar 
employed, 1 
pensioner 
1 Wellington     
9 teachers or 
retired teachers 
1 Stellenbosch        
1 business, 3 
housewives 
  2 Oliver 
Tambo        
(Wellington)  
6 unemployed     
  2 Kylemore 
(Stellenbosch)  
4 white-collar 
employed, 2 
housewives 
 
       
Distant 
hinter- 
Land 
3  Avila Park 
(Vredendal)         
10 unemployed               
1 Vredendal                  
North         6 
unemployed,  1 
informal sector 
  2 Strandfontein 
(West Coast)  3 
white-collar,  1 
housewife 
Of Cape  
Town 
4 Heidelberg         
5 unemployed, 
1 pensioner,  1 
scholar    
2 Heidelberg         
2 unemployed,  
3 blue-collar 
workers, 1 
scholar 
  3 Heidelberg        
3 white-collar 
employed     
Total 4 2 1 2 3 
 
 
 
Classification into the three socio-economic groups used in this Table - poor, middle 
income and affluent - was made after a preliminary analysis of FG data. As we will 
show below, there are striking similarities in FG narratives within these three groups. 
These similarities moreover cross over racial differences in the first two groups. By 
‘poor’, we mean local people who are overwhelmingly unemployed and who speak of 
themselves as chronically poor. By ‘middle income’, we mean local people who are 
either employed in white collar (or established blue collar) positions or who are able 
to remain at home since there is a household member in such a position. The middle 
income group all live in formal dwellings. The ‘affluent’ are Afrikaans-speaking 
established white local people of the selected towns. FG participants were chosen 
from middle class residents found in these towns. 
 
Research on social identity has shown that people construct various individual and 
group identities for themselves. These identities are sometimes in internal tension with 
one another. For an individual or group to act upon some of these identities probably 
frustrates others (Calhoun 1995). We hypothesise, accordingly, that under specific 
circumstances, a primary identity (one that is ‘given priority over other sources of 
meaning’ (Castells 1997:6)) will emerge to prevail over others. One way to identify 
the growing dominance of one identity over others is to detect and describe common 
identity narratives used by individuals and groups and thereby to infer which is being 
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promoted. Such narratives contained in the material gathered during the twelve focus 
group sessions have been carefully analysed with this objective in mind. 
 
Two criteria were used to guide these narrative analyses. Though the FG group 
discussions differed from one another, they all included, as a common feature, 
discussions of concerns shared with other people. These concerns moreover were 
typically geographically located and linked with one of the three spheres of 
government introduced by the three probes. In most cases, such discussion included 
references to cause and effect and to possible resolution of these concerns. Such a 
strand of a FG discussion was defined as a narrative since it was both coherent and 
presented as meaningful to all members of the FG. The second criterion was the 
frequency that certain narratives appeared both within FG discussions as well as 
within FG classes. 
 
THE AFFLUENT  
 
Affluent FG participants very seldom refer to local municipal and political issues. 
What is of meaning to them locally are issues relating to quality of life, such as the 
beauty of the environment or the level of social interaction. ‘It is very quiet here but 
it’s nice for the children’ (STW)3; ‘It is beautiful here but (…) I hate to see 
Stellenbosch being dirty all over. They should pay someone to sweep the streets’ 
(SW); and ‘We are from the platteland… We are different, we are country-like 
people. We think more in terms of the nature, the lifestyle. Quality of life is more 
important than the money we have in the bank. Here in Heildelberg, what I 
experienced is personal courtesy and friendly people’ (HW).  
 
Political meaning is derived from national issues and economic concerns are also 
stated at national level. ‘There is a lot of (lottery) money that is collected … for 
welfare … but the money doesn’t reach those needs’ (STW). ‘(T)he race convention 
in Pretoria was a big bluff … this is the big thing that worries me in this 
country’(STW). ‘The thing that the (state president) said about AIDS, the man sounds 
like a proper lunatic’(SW). ‘I am concerned that our president has such a very peculiar 
attitude towards the farm crisis in Zimbabwe’ (SW). ‘I cannot be very positive (about 
the economy). It will soon have to hit the bottom’ (HW). 
 
The only shared concern of direct local institutional significance was crime. The role 
of police in crime prevention however was not raised by any affluent FG. Rather, 
individual solutions notably through privatised security were raised in each of the 
three FGs. ‘I am prepared to share with you very good and proven ideas on how to be 
safe’ (SW). Self-defence through erecting fences around houses was proposed by 
another participant as the best option. In the Strandfontein and Heidelberg FGs, 
moving to a safer area was proposed as an alternative means to escape crime. 
 
The focus on national political issues is partially explicable by the period during 
which the FGs took place - the second half of 2000. This period was a particularly bad 
one for the national and international image of the presidency and the national cabinet. 
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An influential South African daily recently put it as follows : 
 
The truth is that Mbeki himself, who succeeded the charismatic Nelson 
Mandela 18 months ago, has stumbled badly this year both as a 
politician and a diplomat. First he alienated allies at home and abroad 
with eccentric statements questioning the link between HIV and AIDS, a 
stance that undermined efforts to combat the epidemic in South Africa. 
Then he was condemned for his apparently feeble and indecisive 
response to the political crisis in neighbouring Zimbabwe (Business Day 
27 November 2000). 
 
Accordingly, in their roles as voters, citizens and consumers, affluent FG participants 
draw meaning from national rather than local (or provincial) issues. Though not in 
name, it is clear that the ANC (‘the governing party’) is widely held as responsible for 
much of the country’s malaise (or for their discontent). Corruption, inefficiency, and 
reverse discrimination were raised as examples in FG discussions. As consumers, 
national rather than local state services are identified for criticism. Among grievances 
shared by all participants, personal tax raised for tertiary education and state 
hospitalisation was targeted. In short, ‘as you can see from our situation, it goes right 
into politics so you can see what is really close to our hearts’ (SW), an opinion 
confirmed in Heidelberg: ‘I think all the people…they have a certain mind-shift. I 
think what worries them most is the economy and security (situation) and now we’re 
starting to talk politics’.  
 
A major issue at national level was the protection of Afrikaner identity which was 
clearly articulated in all FGs in terms of both language (Afrikaans) and religion 
(Christianity). ‘(O)ne can build a very beautiful future in this country if you recognise 
the differences in the concepts of identity and ethnicity. This does not mean that we 
have to go back to the old apartheid system’ (HW). ‘Religion is very much part of our 
culture’ (SW). ‘I would like that my children one day get married in a Dutch 
Reformed church’ (STW). Accordingly, mobilisation within community was stated in 
ways associated with the Afrikaner group: ‘As an Afrikaans South African, I feel that 
my language is being suppressed … (T)his is a challenge to work for our language, to 
build a future with that language included in it’ (SW). ‘(I)t would be our fault if it (our 
language) dies, we will then have let it die’ (HW). 
 
Another reaction to the wide-ranging sense of discontent with state activities 
expressed by respondents in all three groups was that of [white] emigration which, 
though distasteful, emerged as an implicit last alternative. ‘I hate to think that I am 
going to lose another child to the foreigners. I already gave up one’ (SW). ‘(T)he 
children feel they don’t have a future in South Africa. The majority of the children 
plan on going overseas’ (STW). ‘(M)y son is going overseas and I can’t stop him as 
his job is threatened’ (HW). 
 
THE POOR 
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In direct contrast to affluent people, the poor are local people par excellence. While 
provincial and national issues are seldom mentioned, the poor centre their narratives 
on local problems and institutions. They seem to draw little meaning in their daily 
lives from the national sphere. Responses to the probe ‘how do you feel about living 
in SA’ ranged from ‘about SA, I am still thinking’ to ‘I am satisfied but I am 
doubting’. Opinions on South Africa included ‘SA is better than before but in my area 
there is nothing better at all’ (AP) and ‘as far as the new SA is concerned, there is no 
change here’ (HB).  
 
Consequently the main focus of their narratives was the area where they stay. As one 
respondent in Oliver Tambo stated: ‘we have problems with the area here only’. Their 
‘area’ moreover is typically much more confined than the town within which they 
live. In fact, this area is often compared negatively to the surrounding town. ‘I don’t 
feel right or well in this place and the way we are treated here is totally unfair for us’ 
(HC). ‘This area is dirty. It causes diseases. There are no pre-schools, no children 
centres. The services are only in town, in Vredendal and you must pay for the taxi’ 
(AP). ‘We have no services, no electricity, no water, even the collecting of dirt is 
bad…Services are much better in town. The only neglected place is our place’ (OT). 
In Vredendal-North, this sense of exclusion and allied resentment was expressed in 
the following terms : ‘Theoretically we are part of the town but not practically. When 
we lived in the old part of Vredendal, we lived next to the rubbish dump, the sewage 
dump and the aerodrome. When we moved to Vredendal-North, suddenly they found 
a suitable place here for the rubbish dump, the sewage dump and the aerodrome… In 
other words, you are the so-called coloured and you will stay where you are, you stay 
on the hill and in the dusty part of town’. 
 
This local identity is defined in race as well as class terms. Local leadership is accused 
of discrimination on both grounds. Respondents in three of the four poor black FGs 
feel they are discriminated against by their municipality who are perceived to favour 
coloureds when it comes to employment (HB, OT, AP), to housing and services in 
general (OT, AP) as well as to schooling (AP). In Heidelberg, ‘the local government is 
not working with us, that is as black people. There was casual work at the 
municipality. We were employed there but we only worked for two days. But we 
discovered that coloured people were still working there until now… At the 
municipality administration, you never see black staff members, the administration is 
full of white and coloured people’ (HB). Talking about the new houses that have been 
built, in Oliver Tambo ‘if you compare our situation with coloured people, they have 
better houses with three or four rooms’. In Vredendal-North racial discrimination by 
the council was described as follows ‘the municipality in Vredendal, they use nice 
words like ‘previously disadvantaged’…but they don’t recognise us. When you are in 
a certain group, they protect you but we as ‘previously disadvantaged people’ are not 
protected’. 
 
Discrimination is also perceived to result from corruption and nepotism. ‘In the new 
local government they practice nepotism, they appoint their own families. They will 
ask you where you come from in the municipality offices, they will ask you whether 
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you’re born here or not, if you are not born here, there is no way you can get a 
job…so there is apartheid among black people now. What they are doing now, they 
oppress poor people. Poor people become poorer and the rich become richer’ (MB). A 
similar statement was made in Vredendal, where it was stated that ‘the land that the 
local government gave us is too small for our (extended) families but the land that 
they assign for themselves is big… They themselves have big estates’ (AP). While in 
Vredendal-North, ‘some streets (in the area) have good services, streets where people 
in top positions live like ANC or SACP. Those people who have high profiles in top 
structures, their streets are tarred’.  
 
Contrary to the affluent who draw meaning from cultural identities, for the poor, 
belonging to community is largely experienced as a local bond. Other than the Xhosa 
language which is experienced as a disadvantage in the job market, no meaning 
appears to have been drawn from Xhosa ethnic identity. Similarly, though Coloured 
identity was mentioned in both FGs, these references were made in order to 
distinguish between White, Black and Coloured and were stated without pride. No 
reference was made to the Afrikaans language.  
 
Local bonding and meanings drawn from local residential area are associated with 
high expectations about municipality performance. These range from asking for help 
to finish a roof to fighting alcohol abuse, from helping a small entrepreneur start a 
business to addressing the ubiquitous unemployment problem. The municipality 
(rather than national or provincial bodies) is held accountable for all such problems. 
Citizenship and the state are both considered to be local and, accordingly, local 
problems call for local solutions. This orientation however deeply disappoints. ‘(T)he 
local government is the closest to us but we see it as a government that is far away’ 
(AP). Indeed, while the council and municipality figure prominently and clearly in 
group narratives - laying to rest the perception that the poor are ill-informed of local 
government functions - the outcome is widespread shared disillusionment. 
  
As voters, the poor are neglected  
 
Disillusionment is not explicitly linked to a political party. Rather, ‘leaders’ are 
distrusted. ‘Our opinions are not listened by the leaders’ (AP). ‘Those who are in 
charge of finances are only concerned about their self-interests ; they do not care 
about us on the ground’ so ‘now we are confused who to vote for in the place where I 
stay’ (HB). ‘The (politicians) come here for their own purposes’ (VN).  
 
In Oliver Tambo, ‘The person who is looking after our ward in the municipality must 
come down to see the needs of the people. We are not satisfied with his work’; in 
Heidelberg-Coloured,  ‘The leaders don’t walk in the streets, from house to house to 
ask what people want and what people need’. ‘I am like a child, they tell me to go and 
play outside when I am in their way. The council is playing with me but when they 
need me, I must go and vote for them’ (VN). It is not surprising then that a respondent 
concluded that ‘I can’t vote because I am the victim of a bad situation’ (AP). 
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As citizens, the poor are ignored and their complaints not addressed  
 
‘The local government treat us like ‘cows’. I appeal to the local government to think 
about us. We want more rights, we must work together in co-operation but the local 
government is unfaithful to us’ (AP). ‘When you go to the municipality with a 
problem, they treat you like a dog treats a cat. They are always fighting’ and ‘when 
you lay some issues on the table for the council, the moment you turn your back, your 
suggestions are thrown in the rubbish bin’ (VN). ‘(T)he informal settlement is in bad 
condition but if you go and report it, no one does anything’ (MB).  
 
The only reference to attempts at organised civil participation were made in the 
Vredendal-North FG:  ‘Here we have a housing problem but the organisation that 
takes the initiative to address this problem is not recognised by the local government’ 
and ‘the services the community needs were named in a … meeting, they (the council) 
didn’t look at those needs. The council does not listen to what the community needs, 
they only do what they want to do’.  
 
As consumers, the poor are deeply dissatisfied and struggle to pay  
 
Unemployment is experienced as more pressing than the quality of municipal service 
delivery. The municipality is perceived both as a potential source of work as well as a 
potential job creation institution. It is severely criticised on both counts. ‘When it 
comes to problems like unemployment, the council doesn’t recognise us, we just have 
to stay where we are’ (VN). ‘(T)here is not one job-creation project organised by the 
municipality that is still operating’ (HC).  
 
Complaints regarding municipal service delivery revolve largely around basic services 
such as hygiene, refuse removal and sanitation. As mentioned above, the perception 
that their area is discriminated against in terms of services is widespread. In 
Vredendal-North : ‘the services that the community need and these needs were named 
in a GOP-meeting, they don’t look at those needs. If you go to the other areas, you 
will get a different picture’. In Oliver Tambo ‘it is all the fault of the municipality 
which mistreats black people. They never come here to collect the rubbish but if it 
were in town, they would do it immediately’. Accordingly, this dissatisfaction is often 
linked to payment for services, pointing to widespread consciousness of consumers’ 
financial responsibilities. ‘(W)e are paying rent but we don’t know for what. We don’t 
have services, no electricity, no water…’ (OT). Complaints were also made regarding 
the distance of schools and clinics from the areas of the poor, and accordingly 
regarding the cost of transportation. 
 
As partners, the poor are marginalised 
 
The poor refer rarely to development-oriented organisations within which they 
participate. The exception is in Vredendal-North: ‘(P)rojects are managed and certain 
groups within the community, those who have close relationships with the council 
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members or the heads of Department are offered jobs opportunities, they are 
appointed as puppet leaders or puppet managers. But at the end of the day people who 
were not even involved in the project get all the credit and praise. When the 
(vegetable-garden) project showed some profit, there were two white people, the town 
clerk and one of the council members, they got all the credit and the workers were not 
even mentioned, no one even thanked them’.  
 
Faced with such comprehensive social exclusion in their towns, the poor do appear to 
develop strategies of coping and of survival. The first is an instrumental view of 
criminal activity. ‘(W)hen we are hungry, we think about crime because there is 
nothing else to do’ (OT). ‘The government can’t blame you to go to crime if you think 
without any food in your stomach’ (AP). ‘(I)f you look at the crimes that are 
committed … a lot of these crimes are committed to get recognition’ (HC). ‘If we are 
a group of men and we know that every Friday the people get paid, we are going to 
rob the people and this leads to gangsterism’ (VN). 
 
A related strategy motivated by perceptions of police inefficiency and racial bias (MB, 
HB, AP) and aimed at defence against local criminal activity is vigilantism. ‘(W)hen I 
find the people who are doing this (stealing from the spaza shop), I’ll take the law into 
my hands because I am tired of the police’ (MB). ‘So I agree with people taking the 
law in their own hands. The government must hand that person over to the community 
so that the community can punish him’ (VN). In the third place, scapegoating and 
xenophobic attitudes emerged within these narratives (AP & VN). ‘The problem here 
in SA, there are a lot of foreigners. Foreigners take the jobs but they don’t give any 
votes’ (AP).  
 
As noted above, the Vredendal North FG was an exception in that it discussed 
organised community initiatives to address ‘problems that the council neglects’. This 
project was described in the following terms ‘We as a community have now decided 
to do our own things, we established organisations which are anti-political to reach 
our goals’ (emphasis added). 
 
THE MIDDLE INCOME  
 
In contrast to the compartmentalized affluent residents and the marginalized poor, 
middle income local people speak regularly on behalf of their local community and 
appeal repeatedly for community action. They thereby appear to make up the mainstay 
of civil society in their town. ‘(T)here are no civic organisations, people are not united 
and the community is not pulling together. Where there is no civic organisation, there 
is no ‘core’ that is looking at the progress ... they should be working together so that 
we can make it…for the sake of our kids’ (KB). ‘(A)ll of us have a responsibility, if 
we go neighbour to neighbour, from street to street, and we see it as my neighbour’s 
child is my responsibility and my neighbour’s safety and the safety of her house is 
also my responsibility - we share each others interests’ (KC). 
 
This attitude of enlightened self-interest is reflected in their accommodating albeit 
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critical attitude to local leaders. ‘(T)he authority appointed and handling the money, 
didn’t go and look for experienced people to run this (housing) project. And so ... 
coloureds people who thought they were experienced enough to run this project came 
to Kylemore, and they gave houses to the people. So if I look to the houses in 
Kylemore, it is the people of Kylemore’s own fault that they have these houses ... The 
people who were in charge of the houses were totally inexperienced’ (KC) ‘(T)he 
government can do so much if the government can play its role also. But also I don’t 
know how because ... when I was making my own research in Kayamandi, I heard that 
sometimes the people who are up there, who are representing Kayamandi to the 
government, it’s like there are many conflicts so they don’t work out something that 
can work for the people’ (KB). ‘(I)t is our people that sit there and those people had to 
transform so fast, I think most of our council members do not have the necessary skill 
to really earn their place on the council … what really happens there is that those 
people are mostly headed by the so-called informed and then make uninformed 
decisions’ (WC). 
 
This shared sentiment of belonging is closely allied to shared religious faith in 
Kylemore and Wellington and leads in all three FG narratives to calls for community 
self-help. In Kylemore, ‘when we talk about shebeens, the Church should play a more 
important role because when one member of the Church has a problem, according to 
the Bible it is the Church responsibility…’. In Kayamandi, ‘the people who come 
from the Eastern Cape, the rural areas, are not willing to take responsibilities to 
progress, to fight for things to happen. People must take responsibilities for their lives 
because they can’t always count on the government. Mandela opened the door but it is 
up to us to enter.’ The self-help theme spills over into community involvement in 
combating crime: ‘(I)f people really feel unsafe, then they must find a solution 
themselves together with a different organisation (such as) community policing … at 
the end of the day, we are responsible for our own pain’ (WC). ‘We have leaders in 
Kylemore, we have tax-payers…we must stand up as a community and say enough is 
enough’ (KC). The other form of combating crime is by appealing to moral values: 
‘families are not a strong point in our communities anymore’ (WC), while in 
Kayamandi, respondents argued that youngsters do not respect the elderly anymore. 
 
As active members of civil society in their towns, the middle income group express 
clear political preferences and view the state both as partner as well as protagonist. 
‘Isn’t this the opportunity to talk to the government?’ asks one respondent in 
Wellington when lottery funds were raised. ‘Before with Apartheid, we were 
dissatisfied with the government, there were marches, people were tortured and people 
were locked up. Now we have another government and if we really are honest we will 
admit that the government is making a mess of things. Now why should we leave the 
government doing this? We are actually giving the government the mandate to just go 
ahead. I believe that if a government, it doesn’t matter what it looks like, does not do 
his job, then we must go over to civil disobedience’ (WC). Similarly in Kylemore, 
‘there must be a definite structural plan in this town that we, as people, can 
draw…because the government must listen to the people, to what we want in our town 
and what we don’t want in our town, like for example, we do not want people to 
13
smuggle (alcohol). I think this is the way we should take action.’ 
 
Simultaneously, meaningful racial identities persist largely as a result of continuing 
residential segregation and associated inequalities. ‘(T)his is a fact, the white areas get 
better treatment than us in terms of services and other things…when you look where 
most people are in Wellington, most of the children are that side of Market Street and 
most of the work is done the other side’ (WC). ‘Kayamandi is a very small area in the 
whole well-developed Stellenbosch so (its isolation) has been done deliberately just to 
draw a line between the poor blacks and the rich whites’ (KB). ‘(T)he system of the 
government is corrupt because some people are still advantaged. The white people 
previously had an advantage and they still have an advantage. They have a bigger 
advantage than us. They want to use School Street for their trucks…at the same time, 
in the white residential area, trucks are not allowed to move through there…so the 
people succeed in doing all kinds of things without being noticed…’ (KC).  
 
Faced with continuing sentiments of separation and social exclusion of the poor in 
their towns, the middle income group also develop coping strategies. These strategies 
differ dramatically from those of the poor since middle income local people reveal 
substantial sources of self-confidence. By taking the interests of their community to 
heart, they propose action though community organisations such as tax-payers’ 
associations (Kylemore) and Employment Schemes to develop the skills of the 
unemployed (Kylemore, Wellington and Kayamandi). Accordingly, strategies include 
lobbying municipalities, organising and empowering community, and if necessary, 
civil disobedience. Ultimately, belief in such strategies led a respondent in the 
Kayamandi FG to exhort that ‘we must all do something to make this country work’. 
 
STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE LOCAL SPHERE: THE CASE OF 
SOUTH AFRICAN TOWNS 
 
The second phase of local government transformation - aimed at introducing 
participative and developmental local government - is mired in country-wide 
problems. Three will be noted: 
 
• ‘... two-thirds of municipalities are financially highly stressed and 
… one third are not financially viable…’ 
• ‘… more than half of local authorities are administratively not up 
to standard and many require immediate help in terms of financial 
controls and management…’ 
•  ... people in different types of residential area are not paying for 
rates and services every month…’ (Bernstein 1998:298). 
 
Substantial evidence of dissatisfaction with local government activities has been given 
above. What does this imply for policy regarding local participation, for proposed 
cooperation and conflict in the local sphere between state and civil society?  
 
Hirschman’s model of loyalty, voice, and exit - of simply stick it out, of expressing 
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dissatisfaction, or of quitting - is particularly useful when applied to people who are 
experiencing decline in the institutions within which they operate. Under such 
conditions of decline, simply sticking it out appears to be the worst option. 
Accordingly, Hirschman makes much of the choice between, and relationship 
between, voice and exit. He argues that there is a cost to using voice and that there 
therefore needs to be a reasonable expectation that voice will make a difference. 
Accordingly, the privileged are more inclined than rank-and-file to use voice since 
they typically are both better organised (and thereby able to maximise the impact of 
voice) and more influential (and thereby able to elicit more attention). The threat of 
exit moreover is often used as part of voice and is effective to the extent that the exit 
of the people involved is judged to be a loss by the organisation, in our case by the 
local council and municipality. On the other hand, exit can constitute a difficult 
choice. Exit from a community usually takes the form of escape by an individual 
notably through upward social mobility.4 The alternative is for community members 
to stick together and develop a collective voice aimed at countering decline in the 
community. The underlying reason for this option is loyalty to this community, 
established by shared values and networks. When a person expresses loyalty to an 
organisation, to exit becomes expensive for it brands the person as disloyal. Such a 
person accordingly when deeply dissatisfied is more inclined to use voice. 
 
An application of these ideas to the narratives of the three groups of local people we 
have identified above proves useful. Moreover, since an interest in public affairs is a 
fundamental precondition for public involvement,5 narratives identifying such interest 
point strongly in the direction of public participation and their absence from such 
narratives to the likelihood of apathy or, at least, of disinterest. Indeed as Klandermans 
and others (2000) argue, interest in public affairs points toward involvement in public 
affairs, and identification of group interest toward collective involvement.6 
 
Affluent local people draw little meaning from public participation in the local sphere. 
Though dependent along with everyone else on local services, they appear satisfied 
with their delivery, both since they are able to pay more for quality services and 
because they are able to privatise a number of them if this becomes necessary. 
Accordingly, though they may be aware of decline in the state-civil society 
relationship in their towns, this barely affects their lives. They reserve their voice for 
national matters which they perceive to affect their lives much more. At this level, as 
Afrikaners, they situate themselves in a wider ethnic community from whence, they 
believe, voice carries collective weight. Exit through emigration, albeit an unpalatable 
option, remains a viable last resort. 
 
Poor local people also draw minimal meaning from public participation in the local 
sphere. Since their social exclusion individualises and marginalizes them, their voice 
is faint and of little influence. Their ability to exit from state services is ruled out for 
these services are essential to their survival strategies and they have no means to buy 
more expensive private services. The poor accordingly find themselves in a double 
bind since to menace with voice or to threaten exit carries little weight with local 
councillors and officials. These local people neither belong to an organised opposition 
15
movement nor are able to withhold substantial payments. Their strategy, typically 
chosen on an individual basis, is one of opting out of civil society (into criminal and 
vigilante activities, for example). 
 
Middle Income local people form the bastion of public participation at local level. 
They express deep loyalty to local civil society and urge the use of voice through a 
variety of stakeholder organisations to promote both conflict-from-within and 
cooperation with council and municipality. Their status and their optimism strengthen 
one another for they believe that their collective voice will make a difference in a 
situation which they believe can improve. 
 
These broadbrush profiles of residential groups in SA towns confirm earlier research 
results: while race forms an integral part of rank-and-file discussions of themselves 
and those around them, it rarely emerges as their primary meaning (see Bekker et al. 
2000). Discussions on provincial and national matters reveal no meaningful provincial 
and weak national identity. It was the local that emerged as primary in this earlier 
1999 research. The one unanticipated result here is the comprehensive and recent 
politicisation of White Afrikaner respondents during the year 2000. Earlier research 
suggested that this group had retreated into ethnic domesticity. 
 
These profiles also strongly suggest that developmental local government faces an 
uphill task, at least in South African towns similar to those sampled here. Civil society 
at local level appears to be incoherent. There was no significant discussion in any of 
the FGs on organisations such as civics, forums or trade unions that made up the core 
of civil society during the country's period of political transition. In the affluent group, 
religious and linguistic identity, though strong, is oriented toward a wider ethnic 
solidarity rather than toward the local town. Among the poor, neither appear as 
important. In the middle income group, on the other hand, religious belief is not only 
meaningful but also perceived to be an important means to community action. 
Participation in state-civil society relations by residents in the local sphere accordingly 
appears to be minimal among the poor - the very grouping development activities 
target - and among the White affluent - the most influential minority in these towns, at 
least in economic terms. The middle income group stands in for local civil society and 
though they express confidence and display zeal, without more comprehensive 
participation, councillors and municipal officials will find the goal of public 
participation elusive. 
 
If public participation remains out of reach, will this disappoint local councillors and 
their municipal officials? Two more insights gleaned from Hirschman again prove 
useful. The first is the possibility that to exit may lead to using voice-from-without, to 
working for change outside the confines of the institution. The case of the community 
organisation in Vredendal North that intends to become overtly anti-political appears 
to have this kind of potential.7 ‘Anti-political’ points to the intention of seeking 
development beyond the municipal sphere, beyond developmental local government. 
If seen to be successful, this would pose a distinct threat to the local council and its 
municipality.  
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On the other hand, Barry (1974:106), in his analysis of Hirschman’s work, argues that 
‘under certain circumstances exit may operate on those running a collectivity not as an 
incentive to improve but as a license to deteriorate’ (emphasis added). Affluent local 
people potentially make up the most vocal section of local consumers, the most 
reliable payers for local services, and the most economically influential group in their 
town. They are also the group least likely to direct their collective voice toward 
council and municipality. They are the least likely to rock the boat. Under 
circumstances of financial stress and administrative incompetence, such a situation 
may well be welcomed by council and municipality alike. ‘Better leave them out than 
bring them in’ may well be the motto. By withholding voice in the local sphere, 
affluent white residents may well be aggravating the current crisis of local government 
in South African towns. 
 
Do these conclusions imply that developmental local government policy and its 
participative planning component, in particular, are defective?  In the sense used 
within this policy, ‘community’ does not appear to exist at local urban level. If this 
idea is understood to refer to a group of people who have together constructed a 
subjectively shared and valued common sentiment, then it certainly seems to be absent 
in South African towns. The quest for participative planning, therefore, has little to do 
with engaging members of the local ‘community’. Rather, it has to do with 
establishing and employing means of communication between different communities 
and groupings within a town and subsequently with attempting to extend civil society 
across these disparate groupings. Public policy constructed with this notion of 
‘community’ is not only wrong but may well be dangerous. It is appropriate to keep in 
mind Frederick Cooper’s (1994:1544) caution that ‘(t)hose who find in the notions of 
‘community’ and ‘new social movement’ a welcome antidote to one sort of 
oppression need to worry about the other forms of oppression that lie within them’. 
Until ‘community’ is deconstructed within the urban populations of South Africa's 
towns, developmental local government policy may well be doing a disservice to 
many in these populations. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. It is important to observe that this call by government for participative local 
government did not begin with the 1998 White Paper. In 1995, fully knowledgeable of 
the volatile nature of land claims and tenure difficulties in different parts of the 
country, the central government legislated the Development Facilitation Act (Act 67 
of 1995). This Act though calling for top-down implementation, did encourage 
community participation in planning initiatives both at local as well as at 
intergovernmental levels. The Western Cape Provincial Government amended the Act 
for implementation in this province and IDP here predates the White Paper. See Smith 
2000. 
 
2. See Mamdani (1996:13-16) and Shils (1991). We use the concept of civil society to 
include actors ranging from individuals to non-government and profit-making 
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organisations in the public sphere, falling between the family and the state. Civil 
society, moreover, whilst autonomous of the state, cannot exist independent of the 
state for it is the state itself that guarantees its autonomy. 
 
3. Abbreviations are defined in Table 2 in Appendix 2. 
 
4. Hirschman gives as an example of individual exit through socio-economic 
promotion African Americans in the United States. 
 
5. Putnam 2000:35. According to Putnam, ‘political knowledge and interest in public 
affairs are critical preconditions for more active forms of involvement. If you don’t 
know the rules of the game and the players and don’t care about the outcome, you’re 
unlikely to try playing yourself’. 
 
6. See Klandermans et al (2000). According to the authors, ‘the more people identify 
with (…) other people, the more they are inclined to act as a member of that 
category”. Quoting Turner, they argue that “identification with a group makes people 
more prepared to act as a member of that group’. 
 
7. A case reminiscent of Castells’ identification of resistance identities as emergent in 
the current era of globalisation. These identities serve as strategies of collective 
survival. See Castells 1997. 
 
APPENDIX 1 METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
 
Research was completed during August and September 2000, a few months before the 
second democratic local government elections which took place in December. 
Principles guiding the selection of focus groups have been given in the main body of 
the paper. The constitution of the focus group began with the identification of a 
coordinator within the milieu of the focus group. This milieu coordinator was 
requested to approach between eight and ten potential adult participants from the 
milieu. The coordinator was also requested to select participants with varying ages as 
well as approximately equal numbers of women and men. Discussions were planned 
to last approximately one hour. The FG venue was selected on the basis of a location 
known to the participants. In four of twelve cases, the venue was a private residence. 
Other venues included clinics, community and municipal halls, a coffee shop, a 
shebeen and a school classroom. 
 
A written copy of the three prompts to be used was made available to the milieu 
coordinator before the FG was convened and the coordinator was requested to 
establish which language would be preferred by participants. Participants were also 
asked for permission to tape-record discussions. Two members of a four member 
research team managed the discussion process of each FG. The team comprised two 
Afrikaans-speakers, one with a Coloured and one with a White background; a Xhosa-
speaker hailing from the Eastern Cape and a research coordinator from the European 
Community who has depth knowledge of South Africa. The three South African 
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members are all graduate students. The research coordinator attended all FGs, each of 
which was introduced and managed by a second team member selected on the basis of 
FG preferred language and shared racial background. No remuneration was offered to 
participants. Refreshments were provided during discussions, and English 
transcriptions of discussions were completed immediately after each meeting. 
 
Discussions ranged from 40 to 90 minutes and were, in some cases, followed by face-
to-face discussions with a few individual participants. A FG with farm workers in the 
West Coast was also held. Results were not considered appropriate for this paper. 
Though three prompts were used, participants were not discouraged from pursuing a 
particular theme. Accordingly, few FGs allocated equal discussion time to each theme. 
In fact, as is clear from the main paper, although most time was spent pursuing issues 
related to the local theme during the poor and middle income FGs, it was not the case 
during the affluent FGs. 
 
Information produced in this manner is qualitative: both the urban residential areas as 
well as the towns sampled, whilst broadly covering both ethnic as well as class 
groupings in the Western Cape province, are not strictly representative. Similarly, FG 
data collected by using three standardised prompts and subsequent non-directive 
techniques, whilst allowing participants to voice their opinions in their selected 
language with minimal researcher influence, are not strictly representative of the 
socio-economic groupings within which they have been classified. Generalisability to 
these socio-economic groupings, to the province, and more extensively, to the country 
as a whole, is limited. Simultaneously, comparable results from earlier work done 
using the same techniques, as well as research team comments on interpretation lead 
us to claim that our findings are valid within a qualitative research context. 
 
The authors would like to thank research team members Oppel Myburgh, Masadie van 
Wyk and Nosi Xabendlini for their contributions. 
 
APPENDIX 2  TABLE 2 OF FGS ABBREVIATIONS  
 
 
Name (Former Group Area) Town Abbreviation 
Mbekweni (B) Paarl MB 
Oliver Tambo (B) Wellington OT 
Avila Park (B) Vredendal AP 
Heidelberg (B) Heidelberg HB 
Vredendal- North (C) Vredendal VN 
Heidelberg (C) Heidelberg HC 
Kayamandi (B) Stellenbosch KB 
Wellington (C) Wellington WC 
Kylemore (C) Stellenbosch KC 
Stellenbosch (W) Stellenbosch SW 
Strandfontein (W) West Coast STW 
Heidelberg (W) Heidelberg HW 
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